The House of Assembly has declined to entrench the office of the Contractor General in the Constitution.
The House of Assembly has declined to entrench the office of the Contractor General in the Constitution, opting instead for a statutory approach to procurement oversight, even as legislation establishing the office remains inactive years after its passage.
The decision came during deliberations on the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) report, specifically Recommendation 17, which urged both the immediate operationalisation of the Contractor General Act, 2021 and the elevation of the office to constitutional status.
The CRC had argued that embedding the role in the Constitution would strengthen transparency, independence, and accountability in public procurement.
However, lawmakers ultimately rejected that approach.
While the House agreed in principle with the need for stronger procurement oversight, it stopped short of endorsing constitutional recognition of the Contractor General.
Instead, members supported implementing oversight strictly through ordinary legislation.
The Committee formally classified the recommendation as “accepted with modifications,” signaling agreement with the objective, but not the method proposed by the CRC.
Crucially, no constitutional amendment was advanced to establish or protect the office.
In its reasoning, the Committee maintained that a statutory framework offers greater flexibility. Members argued that refining the powers, procedures, and independence of the office could be more effectively achieved through legislative amendments rather than constitutional provisions.
Law Still Not in Force
The decision has drawn attention to a lingering issue as the Contractor General Act, passed in 2021, has yet to be brought into force.
Despite broad acknowledgment of the importance of procurement oversight, the delay in operationalising the law raises questions about successive government’s commitment to implementing the very safeguards it now insists should remain outside the Constitution.
The CRC has explicitly recommended that the Act be activated “without delay,” underscoring urgency in strengthening oversight mechanisms. Yet, years later, the office remains non-functional.
Supporters of the Committee’s position argue that avoiding constitutional entrenchment prevents rigidity and allows for easier adjustments over time. They contend that statutory mechanisms can be updated more readily to respond to evolving governance challenges.
Critics, however, may view the decision differently. Without constitutional protection, the office of the Contractor General could be more vulnerable to political influence, budgetary constraints, or legislative changes.
The absence of constitutional status may also limit its perceived independence and authority.
With the constitutional route now off the table, attention turns to whether the government will finally operationalise the Contractor General Act and ensure the office is adequately resourced and empowered.
But until the 2021 law is enforced, the gap between policy intent and practical oversight remains unresolved.
The decision came during deliberations on the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) report, specifically Recommendation 17, which urged both the immediate operationalisation of the Contractor General Act, 2021 and the elevation of the office to constitutional status.
The CRC had argued that embedding the role in the Constitution would strengthen transparency, independence, and accountability in public procurement.
However, lawmakers ultimately rejected that approach.
While the House agreed in principle with the need for stronger procurement oversight, it stopped short of endorsing constitutional recognition of the Contractor General.
Instead, members supported implementing oversight strictly through ordinary legislation.
The Committee formally classified the recommendation as “accepted with modifications,” signaling agreement with the objective, but not the method proposed by the CRC.
Crucially, no constitutional amendment was advanced to establish or protect the office.
In its reasoning, the Committee maintained that a statutory framework offers greater flexibility. Members argued that refining the powers, procedures, and independence of the office could be more effectively achieved through legislative amendments rather than constitutional provisions.
Law Still Not in Force
The decision has drawn attention to a lingering issue as the Contractor General Act, passed in 2021, has yet to be brought into force.
Despite broad acknowledgment of the importance of procurement oversight, the delay in operationalising the law raises questions about successive government’s commitment to implementing the very safeguards it now insists should remain outside the Constitution.
The CRC has explicitly recommended that the Act be activated “without delay,” underscoring urgency in strengthening oversight mechanisms. Yet, years later, the office remains non-functional.
Supporters of the Committee’s position argue that avoiding constitutional entrenchment prevents rigidity and allows for easier adjustments over time. They contend that statutory mechanisms can be updated more readily to respond to evolving governance challenges.
Critics, however, may view the decision differently. Without constitutional protection, the office of the Contractor General could be more vulnerable to political influence, budgetary constraints, or legislative changes.
The absence of constitutional status may also limit its perceived independence and authority.
With the constitutional route now off the table, attention turns to whether the government will finally operationalise the Contractor General Act and ensure the office is adequately resourced and empowered.
But until the 2021 law is enforced, the gap between policy intent and practical oversight remains unresolved.
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